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Louis Pollak is a man of quiet dignity and great restraint; a superb lawyer whose
commitment, skill, and talents were vital components of our (NAACP) landmark
case, Brown v. Board of Education, 1954; and a scholar and teacher who has had
tremendous influence in passing and developing superior lawyers.
Roy Wilkins
Executive Director and Secretary, NAACP

Only in Philadelphia, home of the internationally beloved Flye~s. would there be
a law school dean who has come closest to performing the deanship "hat trick." Lou
Pollak has been Dean of Yale and now is Dean at Penn. A manifest destiny suggests
that some third law school looms in the future. To list his achievements would seem
puckish if asserted about anyone else. Indeed, one skates on thin ice in talking about
Lou; the cold facts are incredible. For him, self-seeking and personal gain always
have been beyond the line. The net of it amounts to deanships, distinguished professorship, just plain professor, civil rights lawyer, school board member, vice-president
ofthe NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, activist father of five activist
daughters and married to a lovely wife, author of innumerable scholarly articles as
well as a history of the Constitution and the Supreme Court. But most of all he is one
who has never taken his eyes off life's most important goals: truth, service to
mankind, friendship, and thought.
Jack Greenberg
Director Counsel
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
Louis Pollak is genial and has a ready wit. Since he lives with (but does not
preside over) a family of six women persons, his domestic environment has nurtured
his tact. These engaging traits overlay other virtues, including guileless compassion,
scholarly erudition, and calm judgment. Though special verdicts must pronounce on
past events, old hands' prophesies are often humored; I foresee that the Pollak
deanship will continue to be acclaimed.
Clarence Morris
Professor Emeritus
University of Pennsylvania Law School

One of my happiest contributions to the Law School during my tenure as dean
was in helping to bring Lou Pollak to the school as the first Greenfield Professor. He
is a person of great intellect, vision, and dedication.
Bernard Wolfman
Former Dean
University of Pennsylvania Law School
No one in this nation has had more wise or penetrating insights on the federal
constitutional process than Dean Louis Pollak. He symbolizes the academic profession at its best. He has been more than an aloof critic; most important, he is an
effective contributor to the improvement of the legal process in its day-to-day operation. As a Yale alumnus, I know that his leaving was a significant loss to that law
school; but as a lecturer at the University ofPennsylvania Law School, I am pleased
that, despite its fame and abundance of talent, Penn is now an even better school
by having Dean Pollak here with us.
Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
U.S. District Court
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
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No one has exemplified qualities of justice more consistently than has Lou Pollak
throughout his career. Tolerant, ever fair almost to a fault, and understanding, he
never allows the stress ofthe moment to turn him away from his disciplined and
informed sense of what is right. Do not be misled by his patience. He will steer a
steady upward course toward the highest academic and professional standards
attainable.
Hon. Gerhard A. Gesell
U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia

Be good, the sweet maid was told, and let who will be clever. It sounded like a
sad, inevitable trade-off; but Louis Pollak unites a character on which the maid
might model herself with an intellect that includes and transcends cleverness. As a
jurist, scholarly or forensic or both, he adapts ingeniously chosen means with gracefully carved words in the service of nobly cherished ends. As a dean (at Yale, at least,
but not last), he sought without sacrifice ofprinciple to please those who could hardly
be pleased, to like those it was hardest to like, to extend most sympathy to the least
sympathetic.
Leon S. Lipson
William K. Townsend Professor of Law
Yale Law School

I have known Lou Pollak since he was, as the saying went in those days, "kneehigh to a grasshopper." I welcomed him to my classes back in the early post-war
years. As colleague, I spent many pleasant and enlightened hours working with him
in and out of the classroom. I watched him as dean in the late sixties handling some
difficult problems with an understanding and firmness that won him the ultimate
admiration of all factions, sub factions and spin-offs of factions. As a highly intelligent, dedicated, and warm-hearted worker and critic, Lou Pollak has made a unique
contribution to the progress of democratic values in our nation.
Thomas I. Emerson
Lines Professor of Law
Yale Law School

It has been my great good fortune to have known Louis Pollak and enjoyed his
friendship since the early days of his deanship of the Yale Law School. I admire
him for his fine intellect. More especially, I salute him as a gentle and pure spirit
committed powerfully to that which is kindly and just in human relations. I make
particular note ofour efforts that, in common cause with others, brought about the
establishment of the Section ofIndividual Rights and Responsibilities in the American BM Association. That he has assumed the deanship of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School pleases me beyond measure.
Jefferson B. Fordham, Dean Emeritus
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Professor of Law
University of Utah College of Law
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Lou Pollak was an early crusader for equal rights, nationally as well as in New
Haven. He was allied before the Supreme Court with Thurgood Marshall in a series of
historic cases dealing with civil rights. Then, with Constance Baker Motley, a New
Haven native and now a federal judge, he was the attorney of record in the Supreme
Court case which resulted in the dismissal of miscegenation as a law against
mankind.
In our city during the fifties and sixties, Lou was on the side ofthe angels,
although some differed on the color of the angels' robes. But to those of us who were
fighting for the cause of equal opportunity, he was a genuine crusader willing to
mount the barricades and repel the Philistines, and he did. He fought the good fight
for quality education, and as a member of the Board of Education during my years in
City Hall, he took as a personal challenge the city's obligation-indeed society's
obligation-to provide quality education in all neighborhoods tnroughout our city.
When he left New Haven, something special went out of all our lives. It is the
good fortune of the University of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia to be the beneficiary
of Lou Pollak's wisdom and leadership.
Richard C. Lee
Former Mayor of New Haven
Connecticut
The question is often put in a foolish way; would Lou Pollak give you the shirt off
his back? Of course he would. But ifthe emphasis is altered a little-would Lou
Pollak give YOU the shirt off his back-the answer is less simple. Yes, he would
indeed, if he thought you were at heart warm, compassionate, generous, gentle--or
would be ifyou hadn't been pushed around or been born the wrong color. He has all
these traits to a degree that is almost unbelievable. I believe it because I had the
privilege of working with him in the worst of times, when his goodness never faltered.
Ralph S. Brown, Jr.
Associate Dean
Yale Law School, 1965-1970
Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law
Yale Law School
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Alexander Capron,
Acting Vice-Dean
of the Law School

LAW ALUMNI DAY IS
THURSDAY, APRIL 29,
1976

Professor Gorman to be
Associate Dean
Professor Robert A. Gorman will
become Associate Dean of the Law
School as of July 1, 1976. In the next
Journal, we will report more fully
Mr. Gorman's distinguished credentials as well as on his responsibilities
in this newly created position.
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Acting Vice-Dean Capron
Professor Alexander Capron will
serve as acting Vice-Dean of the Law
School until the spring semester's
end, thus completing the term of
Frank N. Jones, who resigned from
that position in mid-January.
The Vice-Dean heads most of the
Law School's administrative offices
and is the Dean of Students. A
committee is presently in search of a
permanent Vice-Dean.

Biddle Library's
Bicentennial Exhibit
"Touched with Fire," a memorial
exhibition marking the fortieth
anniversary of the death of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, is on view at
the Law School until May 31, 1976.
The show, Biddle Law Library's
first contribution to the bicentennial
celebration, has been borrowed from
Harvard Law School and was
mounted by Reference Librarian,
Nancy Arnold.
The exhibit contains copies of
Holmes's letters to legal notables as
well
as
photographs
and
memorabilia, a copy of Holmes's
death mask by sculptor Gutzon
Borglum, and a first-edition copy of
Justice Holmes's distinguished legal
text, his only authored book, The
Common Law.

Thomas A. O'Boyle Lecture
to take place April 15
The second Thomas A. O'Boyle
Lecture will be delivered by Robert
M. Loeffler, Trustee of the Equity
Funding Corporation of America, on
Thursday, Aprill5 at 4 p.m. in Room
100 at the Law School.
Mr. Loeffler's lecture "PostMortem on a Corporate Fund," will
analyze the causes of the collapse ,of
the Equity Funding Corporation,
describing some of the lessons to be
drawn from this interesting chapter
in U.S. financial history.
Founded by friends and colleagues
of the late Mr. O'Boyle, L'40, the
Thomas A. O'Boyle Visiting Practitioner Fund will sponsor the lecture. The Fund's purpose is to induce
experienced and distinguished practitioners to make an educational
contribution to the life of the Center
for Study of Financial Institutions,
Penn Law School, and the community.

The Owen J. Roberts
Memorial Lecture for 1976
will be held on
October 18.
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Clerkships 1975-1976
Two alumni of the Law School are
serving as law clerks during the
current academic year. We were
recently made aware of their appointments and wish to acknowledge
them at this time.
State Courts

Superior Court of Los Angeles
County
Judge Harry L. Hupp
Elliot J. Hahn, L'74
County Court of New Jersey, Cape
May
Judge Nathan C. Staller
Judge James A. O'Neill
David S. Yen, L'75

A Reception for Third- Year
Students
In an effort to ease the transition
from law student to active practitiOner,
Philadelphia Common
Pleas Court Judge Doris M. Harris
and the Board of Managers of the
Law Alumni Society held an informal reception for third-year students
in Courtroom 653 of City Hall. This
afforded the students the opportunity to informally meet Common Pleas
and Municipal Court judges and
become acquainted with the court
facilities.

7
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Bernard Wolfman
In July, former Dean Bernard Wolfman, L'48, will
become the Fessenden Professor of Law at Harvard,
continuing to teach in his field of specialization, federal
taxation and tax policy.
Mr. Wolfman is the fourth consecutive holder of the
Fessenden chair to have been associated in some
manner with Penn Law School or the University. Ralph
Baker, L'll, a brilliant alumnus who distinguished
himself in the area of corporation law was the first
Fessenden Professor; following him was David Cavers,
a University of Pennsylvania Class of'23 graduate; and
his immediate predecessor, James Chadbourn, a
member of the Penn Law faculty for many years, taught
Wolfman evidence when he was a law student at the
school.
The decision to bring to a close his long-standing
professional affiliation with the University of Pennsylvania and Penn Law School, which spanned the years
beginning with his matriculation as an undergraduate at
age 17, was a most difficult one. Wolfman joined the
Penn Law faculty as a full-time Professor of Law in
1963, became the Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of tax
law and tax policy in 1973, and served as Dean of the
Law School from the year 1970 until his resignation in
June 1975.
Noyes Leech, Professor of Law and a long-time friend
and associate of Mr. Wolfman expressed:
Bernie's departure as a colleague and friend will be
deeply felt. His outstanding accomplishments as
our dean we acknowledged last year when he left
for California. Now we are losing a brilliant teacher
and fellow scholar and a colleague whose social
conscience made a strong impression on those
around him. I have known Bernie since our first
week together at this Law School in 1946. I
immediately admired his quick and restless mind.
He seemed to have been born with a lawyer's
instincts built-in. What was more, he always cared
about the way the law worked (or didn't work). He
told his students not to forget that they were "in the
justice business." I will be sorry that my students
will not also be taught by him. But we can
understand his decision, after so many years at
Penn, to look for another frame for his work and
we thank him for all he has done for this school in
the years past.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol11/iss3/1

Frank N. Jones
One needed only to hear his eloquent speech last Law
Alumni Day or to read excerpts from it in the Fall 1975
Journal to recognize the deep and vital commitment felt
by then Vice-Dean Frank N. Jones to the legal
assistance movement. Before coming to Penn Law
School two and a half years ago, he served as Executive
Director of the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association. Therefore, his return this past February to
that organization and_ to his former executive position
was like "going back where he belongs."
In a letter notifying Dean Pollak of his decision to
return to NLADA, Frank Jones wrote, "With the
advent of the newly created National Legal Services
Corporation, the legal assistance movement enters
perhaps its most critical and sensitive phase. The
decisions made in the next two years will, in my
judgement, determine the course of legal services
delivery and access to the justice system for decades to
come. I very much want to actively participate in this
process."
Responding to Jones' departure, Professor Howard
Lesnick, in a message on behalf of his colleagues stated:
The faculty acknowledges and appreciates the
contribution which Frank Jones has made to the
life of the school during his tenure as Vice-Dean.
We regret his decision to leave but take satisfaction
as well as solace in the fact that his work will place
him on the frontier of efforts to enhance the quality
of legal representation, work which is, after all, not
wholly unrelated to our own goals and function.
We wish him well.
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Featured event
Instant Replay:

The 1975 Keedy finals

by Creed C. Black, Jr., L'76

Four of the Law School's "fledgling lawyers" argued
Lamb v. Farina before a distinguished panel of judges
in the final round of the Edwin R. Keedy Cup moot
court competition. Darius Tencza and Paul Zarefsky
(counsel for respondent Farina) walked away with the
coveted Keedy Cup, leaving Jeff Pasek and Bob
Katzenstein (counsel for petitioner) with the satisfaction of a job well done.
Justice William Rehnquist, U.S. Supreme Court,
presided over the panel which also included Chief
Judge Frank Coffin, First Circuit Court of Appeals,
and Judge Shirley Hufstedler, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In announcing the court's decision, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist termed the performances "very fine"
and observed that all the participants deserved
"commendation." (The Justice's first try at that word
sounded much like "condemnation," producing a
round of laughter.) Judge Hufstedler also found the
competition to be "outstanding," adding that she took
great personal pleasure in observing young lawyers at
the "fledgling stage" of their exposure to the "exhilarating arts of oral advocacy." Judge Coffin
expressed his hope that advocacy of such a caliber
might be seen "more often" in the federal courts.
Noting the tendency of counsel to fluster slightly at
difficult questions from the bench, he assured the four
students that they would in time cultivate "more
placidity" in pursuing their arguments.

Editor's Note: The 1975 Keedy Finals were held on
November 18. This excerpted account of the argument
was reported in the January 21, 1976, issue ofThe
Penn Law Forum, a bimonthly publication written and
produced by students at the Law School.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

Lamb, on cert. to the Supreme Court, involved two
ISSUes:

I. Should the exclusionary rule be modified to
admit evidence obtained under an invalid search
warrant, where the police officers obtained and
executed the warrant in good faith?
2. Should a state criminal defendant be precluded
from raising search and seizure claims on a federal
habeas corpus proceeding, where those claims have
been finally adjudicated against him in the state courts?

The petitioner's position was that both of these
questions should be answered affirmatively; the
respondent argued in favor of the retention of the
present exclusionary rule and the present broad scope
of habeas review.
Courteous and attentive, the judges permitted
counsel to make their arguments without constant
interruption; yet the panel did not hesitate to pose
difficult questions directed at key weaknesses in either
side's position. The comments of Judge Hufstedler set
the tone of the argument; her sharp and penetrating
grasp of the issues which she carefully pursued,
frequently placed counsel on unfamiliar gound. Both
she and Judge Coffin effectively challenged the careless
use of statistics by counsel for both parties. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist interjected an occasional question but did
not press his point; his neutral attitude was surprising
and, to some, a disappointment. His reluctance to
become embroiled in disputes over the merits of the
case, however, is perhaps explained by the fact that the
Supreme Court has granted cert. in Rice v. Wolff, a
real case raising the same issues as Lamb.
9
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fomethng to fay a perronal \liON
The Prospects for Deregulation
by Professor James 0. Freedman

In an address to a joint session of Congress in October
1974, President Ford called for the creation of a
National Commission on Regulatory Reform "to
undertake a long over-due total reexamination of the
independent regulatory agencies." He has followed that
request with a campaign for "deregulation"- a reduction in the amount of regulation of business now carried
on by the administrative agencies of the federal
government.
President Ford in not alone in his concern for the
failings of the independent regulatory agencies. Most
modern Presidents, Democrats as well as Republicans,
have been distressed by the performance of the
administrative process and appointed commissions to
recommend change. But few changes have resulted ,
even though several of the commissions produced useful
reports.
Although President Ford's advocacy of deregulation
is generally regarded as the conventional conservative
approach to economic matters, many liberals, such as
Senator Kennedy, seem to share his conviction that
basic changes are needed in the federal administrative
process.
Given the fact that conservatives and liberals alike
have been dissatisfied for so long with the performance
of the federal regulatory agencies, why have there been
so few attempts at improvement by Congress? Why have
the independent regulatory agencies been criticized so
consistently but reformed so rarely?
In my judgment, the problematic status of administrative agencies reflects our failure as a society to
resolve a basic ambivalence toward the idea of
regulation itself.
The decision to rely upon administrative agencies as
dominant instrumentalities of modern government
probably stems most directly from the impact of the
Depression on American life. In addressing the
economic problems created by the Depression, President Roosevelt created an armada of administrative
agencies to carry out national policies of economic
recovery and social reform.
The New Deal's decision to rely so heavily upon

This article is drawn from Freedman, "Crisis and
Legitimacy in the Administrative Process," 27, Stanford
Law Review, 1041 (1975).
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administrative agencies to implement new national
policies reflected practical considerations that had long
been recognized:
~ Administrative agencies could respond more
promptly and flexibly than Congress or the courts to
changes in the conditions being regulated.
~ Because of their expertise and specialization,
administrative agencies were far more likely than
Congress to recognize subtle changes in industrial
activity and to appreciate their regulatory implications.
~Because of their relative freedom from judicial
norms of procedure and from the heritage of the
common law, administrative agencies were far more
likely than courts to respond with innovative vigor, as
well as a sympathetic commitment, to the purposes of
the legislation they were administering.

Although the remedies of the New Deal
demonstrated the utility of the administrative process
in meeting serious national problems, it seems clear in
retrospect that the prominence that President
Roosevelt gave to the administrative process was not
the result of any well-thought-out philosophy of
governmental action. Roosevelt was a pragmatist
rather than a dogmatist, willing to replace one
approach with another if it bore greater promise of
success.
The New Deal represented a national commitmentborn of the social consensus of the time and broadly
supported by a majority of Americans ever since-that
there should be increased governmental intervention in
the economy.
The apparent success of the variegated responses
that Roosevelt fashioned to meet the nation's exigencies served to obscure the fact that he lacked a coherent
philosophy of when, and to what degree, such
governmental intervention was appropriate-except,
of course, that it should stop somewhere short of
complete governmental planning of economic activity
and decisions.
To the present day, Americans have failed to develop
or agree upon a coherent philosophy of governmental
activism in economic matters. The nearest approach our
society has made to achieving such a philosophy has
been to secure general agreement for the proposition
that the appropriate extent of governmental activism in

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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planning and controlling the economy lies somewhere
between the polarities defined by Adam Smith and Karl
Marx.
An ideology of such imprecision may befit a
pragmatic people, but is hardly adequate to delimit the
perennial debate that our society conducts on the
proper role of government in regulating the economy.
When a nation cannot find the intellectual
wherewithal to formulate a coherent ideology on an
issue as fundamental to its values as the balance to be
struck between a free market and state regulation, such
regulation as it does authorize will always be subject to
philosophic as well as pragmatic question.
And as long as the legitimacy of governmental
regulation is subject to question, the legitimacy of
administrative agencies assigned to carry out specific
tasks of regulation will also be challenged.
The ambivalence that has frustrated our attempts as a
society to arrive at a coherent ideology of governmental
activism has also caused Congress to legislate most
economic regulation in evasive generalities, leaving to
the respective administrative agencies the essential tasks
of evolving regulatory policies.
One result of the simplification implicit in such broad
delegations of legislative power has been to make
administrative agencies, rather than Congres.s, the arena
for debate and decision on complex policy questions of
fundamental importance to our democracy.
Many agencies have been criticized for their failure to
develop coherent policies in the course of their
regulatory activities. Yet when Congress has failed to
adopt a set of social preferences for resolving such
difficult issues as typically lie behind broad delegations
of power, an administrative agency, itself now exposed
to the conflicting political forces that led Congress to
shrink from a decisive response in the first instance, can
hardly be expected to do better.
President Ford recently told a meeting of the
chairmen of the federal regulatory agencies that
"government should intrude in the free market only
when well-defined social objectives can be attained."
A program of deregulation will require Congress to
specify the social objectives it seeks to attain by its
particular programs of economic regulation.
Perhaps the present climate will embolden Congress
to make those hard decisions. But if past is prologue,
the prospects are not promising.
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Professor Bender on Abortion:

~hould CZhere

Be a Coflstitutional
c:Amendment?
Paul Bender, Professor of Law, delivered this statement
on February 5, 1976, to the Civil and Constitutional
Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, in Washington, D.C. His testimony,
reprinted here in its entirety, probes the question of
whether there should be a constitutional amendment
designed to overrule the Supreme Court's 1973 abortion
decision (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113.).
1. Before addressing the specifics of any of the three
main types of proposed abortion amendments, it seems
to me important to ask whether it is wise, at this time, to
attempt any amendment primarily designed to overrule
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. For a
number of reasons, I do not favor any such amendment
at the present time.
As a general matter, it has not been part of our
constitutional tradition to amend the Constitution in
response to unpopular and assertedly erroneous
Supreme Court decisions recognizing new constitutional rights. Were Roe v. Wade to be overruled by
an amendment, thus eliminating a right found by the
Court to be inherent in the due process guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that would, so far as I know,
represent a unique event in American constitutional
law.
I think our traditional restraint in this regard has been
wise, and I believe it has had more than a small part in
shaping a society which is widely and properly admired
throughout the world for its generous and responsible
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol11/iss3/1

recognition of individual rights. The Supreme Court
may, indeed, make mistakes. In my view, the contemporary Court most often errs in the direction of too
little- rather than too much-recognition of rights, but
the possibility certainly exists that the Court may, at
times, carry rights too far. Short-term discontent with
Court decisions in this area is not, however, a valid
guide to when the Court has erred. Most decisions
which have newly recognized rights and which have also
provoked an immediate critical reaction by substantial
segments of the public-one thinks, for example, of the
segregation cases or the reapportionment cases- have
ultimately come to be thoroughly accepted by almost
everyone as parts of our constitutional fabric.
Moreover, where the Court does err and where a
consensus of responsible opinion develops over the
course of time to that effect, the Court is capable of
pulling back in subsequent decisions or of injecting
modifications and exceptions.
This system of primarily judicial evolvement of our
constitutional rights has, I repeat, worked very well,
although it has surely not been perfect. But we do not
know of any better structure, and we can observe many
that are worse. To create a precedent in favor of the
quick overruling of Supreme Court decisions vindicating constitutional rights might upset the balance of
our system so as to cause us much future grief. We
should run that risk, if ever, only in the very unlikely
event that a decision proves fundamentally wrong and
12
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dangerous by the test of time and where the Supreme
Court, for some reason, remains enduringly oblivious to
that fact.
Coming to the specifics of Roe v. Wade, I also do not
favor these amendments because I think that that casehard case that it was- was probably correctly decided
and was certainly not so clearly incorrectly decided as to
warrant the unprecedented action of overruling through
amendment. If ever used, that process should be
reserved for cases that are clearly and demonstrably
wrong. We should not tamper with our Constitution
unless we are sure we are right.
The Court in Wade held that the right to abortion is
part of the fundamental right of substantive personal
privacy- the right to be one's self. This right of privacy
affords restrictions on governmental interference with
personal activities that are so intimate in nature and so
related to the expression and pursuance of individual
personality, belief, and taste- to the "pursuit of
happiness" referred to in the Declaration of
Independence- that the private citizen must be permitted to make his or her own value choices. In most
cases the private activities covered by the right to
privacy are also of little or no legitimate interest to
others in the society or to the government.
The Supreme Court has applied -the right of privacy
primarily to matters of sexual conduct, childbearing,
and child raising, and most of its decisions have, I think,
struck a responsive chord in the nation as a whole. The
principle of substantive privacy is alive and growing.
Viewed as a protection of a woman's right to decide
whether or not to have children and how to use her own
body and mind, the abortion decision fits well within the
principle.
It is urged, however, that the abortion cases are
different because, unlike other privacy cases, they
involve a legitimate governmental reason for interfering
with privacy. That reason is the protection of the fetus.
Whether or not the fetus is a "person" under the law, it is
at least a specifically potential person. It is also
sometimes suggested that antiabortion laws do not
interfere with privacy to as great a degree as some other
laws which affect the use of one's own body because the
need for abortion can be avoided through the use of
birth control.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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It may be that the development and availability of
birth control technology will eventually justify the
conclusion that antiabortion laws do not constitute a
significant interference with privacy. That would
require a universally available and universally safe
method of birth control, and it would also require a
comprehensive and thoroughgoing program of universal sex education from a very? early age, so that what
was theoretically available in the way of birth control
would also be practically available to everyone
whenever needed. Our present birth control practices
fall far short of this standard.
The constitutionality of abortion laws under the
principle of substantive privacy thus turned , at the time
of Roe v. Wade, and still turns, on a balancing of
women's constitutionally protected privacy interests, on
the one hand, against the State's interest in protecting
fetal life, on the other. There are several reasons why I
believe that the Court's decision in favor of the
constitutional privacy interests cannot be said to have
been demonstrably wrong.
First, as a general proposition, it is not clear just how
strong the fetal interests are which we must weigh
against privacy. We still do not know- and may never
know-the extent to which the fetus, at various stages of
its development, is conscious of sensation or reason.
Such consciousness would not seem very probable at the
earliest stages of pregnancy. It is true that it can be
argued with some force that fetal interests surpass
women's privacy interests at some stage of the
developmental process prior to birth, but the Court,
recognized this view in Wade by protecting abortion at
early- but not at late- stages of pregnancy. Given the
constitutional protection for the use of contraceptives, a
line needs to be drawn somewhere, and I should think it
would be hard to say with assurance that the Court
clearly drew the line in the wrong place. Furthermore,
many proponents of antiabortion legislation seem
themselves to recognize that the state's interest in
protecting fetal life is, at best, substantially weaker than
its interest in protecting human life generally. I see no
other way to explain the commonly proposed exceptions for abortions necessary to save the mother's life or
health or for abortions requested by the victims of rape.
We do not normally permit one person to take another
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person's life to save his or her own life or health when the
person killed was entirely blameless. We certainly would
not ordinarily permit a person to be killed because he or
she was conceived as the product of a rape.
A second group of reasons for suspecting the strength
of the fetal interest-as weighed against the woman's
privacy interest- flows from the fact that antiabortion
legislation primarily affects women's privacy rather
than men's. Our society has, unfortunately, not always
been as alert as it should be to protect against laws which
uniquely harm women. It is relevant, I think, that we do
not know how antiabortionists would weigh the
competing fetal and privacy interests if vindicating the
right to fetal life caused men, as well as women, to suffer
an intrusion similar to that resulting from the compulsion to carry ~n unwanted child in one's body.
Finally, the probable correctness of Roe v. Wade is,
for me, supported by the practicalities of the enforcement of antiabortion legislation. However evenhanded
such legislation might be in theory, we know that it has
not been and, indeed, cannot be, comprehensively and
evenly enforced. People who are financially better off
than the average will often be able to obtain both legal
and illegal safe abortions despite antiabortion legislation in the state where they live. Poorer people, on the
other hand, are much more likely to experience either a
real deprivation of access to abortion or to be driven to
submit themselves to horrendously unsafe procedures.
Again, we do not know how the competing fetal and
privacy interests would be weighed if everyone- not
only the poor and not only women- were to be
subjected to this kind of oppression by antiabortion
legislation. The choice is not as between abortion and no
abortion, it is between safe abortion and unsafe
abortion and between abortion for the wealthy and
abortion for everyone. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Roe v. Wade did not directly allude to some of these
factors regarding discriminatory effects upon women
and the poor, but they may have been in the Court's
mind. In all events, these factors certainly seem relevant
to the question of whether Wade can properly be
considered a demonstrably erroneous decision.
2. With regard to the specific amendments before
the subcommittee, the outline of suggested issues states
that they are of three main types. The first type would
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say that the fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the
Constitution and would prohibit any person from
terminating the life of a fetus. The second type would
declare that the fetus has a right to life and would
prohibit government from depriving the fetus of that
right without due process. The third type would permit
the states, or Congress, or both, to legislate on the
subject of abortion.
There are enormous technical and conceptual
problems with the first type of amendment, which
makes the fetus a person and which seeks directly to
protect the life of the fetus against private as well as
governmental action. Our Constitution does not
ordinarily seek to limit private action or to adjust
interests between private persons. The Thirteenth
Amendment forbids private, as well as governmentally
imposed, slavery, but it is unique in thus directly
addressing private conduct. Normally, it is the
prerogative of the states to decide what rights persons
should have against other persons. Thus, even if the
fetus is to be deemed a person for all constitutional
purposes, I should think it wisest and most consistent
with the general federal-state allocation of responsibilities to leave it up to the states to decide, in the first
instance, how that person is to be protected. Moreover,
if there were to be a direct federal constitutional fetal
right against abortion, the question would arise how
that right w·as to be enforced. Will the states somehow
be affirmatively required to pass and enforce antiabortion legislation, or does the amendment contemplate
federal antiabortion laws and federal enforcement
machinery? Neither of these seems an attractive alternative.
The first type of amendment would also take all
constitutional protections presently given persons and
would apply them to the fetus. There are serious
difficulties here. Think, for example, about how the
equal protection clause would apply to the fetus. Would
states which generally permit tort recovery for
negligence be required to permit tort action against
mothers by their children for negligently taking drugs
during pregnancy which result in deformities at or after
birth? Many states, I suspect, would not want to
entertain such suits in view of the great danger of
collusive litigation.
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While the first type of amendment may go too far in
involving the federal government too directly in
deciding whether or not to permit abortion, the second
type, declaring a right to life and prohibiting the states
or the federal government from depriving the fetus of
life without due process, does not seem to me to go far
enough to accomplish their objective. Although some
abortions are performed by employees of the government, many abortions are also performed by private
doctors in private institutions. A constitutional prohibition directed merely to state deprivation of fetal life
might leave these private abortions unregulated, and it
might also fail to validate those state prohibitions on
private abortions that Roe v. Wade held unconstitutional. There would also be difficulty, I believe,
in determining how to afford the fetus procedural due
process before the decision whether or not to abort is
made.
At the same time as these right-to-life amendments
may be under-inclusive in failing to overrule Roe v.
Wade, they may be dramatically over-inclusive in
seeking to "guarantee" fetal life. Such an abstract
guarantee suggests affirmative duties on the part of the
states. Is it intended, for example, that the states be
required to provide free prenatal care to all pregnant
women so as to avoid miscarriage and fetal death
wherever possible and so as to ensure the healthiest
possible fetus and child?
The third type of proposed amendment seems to me
to create less difficulty than the other two. Authorizing
the states to prohibit or regulate abortion if they wish to
do so overrules Roe v. Wade without depriving the
states of the prerogative of deciding whether or not they
want to make all or some abortions illegal. The ordinary
division of responsibilities between state and federal
governments, as I have noted above, counsels in favor of
permitting states to permit abortions , if they wish to do
so.
Nor would it seem to me to be wise to authorize
Congress, as well as the states, to prohibit abortion, as
some of the type-three amendments would do . That
would raise the possibility of Congress prohibiting
abortions within states whose citizens want to permit
them- another federal invasion of state prerogatives. If
state abortion laws were to be permitted through the
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amendment process, it would also seem to me to be best
to thus validate orily those laws which are enacted after
the proposed amendment is adopted, rather than
reviving laws which may have originally been enacted
decades before Roe v. Wade struck them down. Women
whose privacy is to be affected by an antiabortion
constitutional amendment would seem to me to be
entitled, at the very least, to a fresh, contemporary
legislative decision on the question. I would also think
some serious problems lurked behind a provision
authorizing legislation designed to protect life at every
stage of biological development. Unless there is an
intention to overrule the contraception as well as the
abortion cases, proposed amendments should be
explicitly limited to authorizing legislation protecting
the fetus at some time after conception . Finally, it would
seem to me to be extremely unfortunate to adopt any
amendment which would authorize prohibiting even the
so-called morning-after pill, which may turn out to be
the safest and most effective contraceptive that our
technology can derive. Whatever the merits of the
abortion controversy, there appears to be general
agreement that the right of privacy encompasses at least
the decision whether or not to use contraceptives, as
recognized in the Supreme Court's decision in Grisold v.
Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird. The distinction
between a day-before and morning-after pill seems to
me too fragile to support a constitutional dividing line
by way of amendment.
While I believe that a "states rights" type of
amendment, properly limited, is thus the most acceptable type of proposal before you, I do not want to leave
you with the impression that I favor such an amendment. For the reasons given in the first part of this
statement, I emphatically do not favor any amendment
designed to overrule Roe v. Wade at the present time . I
would not lightly substitute majoritarian decision
making for the judicial evolution of our rights, which
has worked so well over the course of years. In the area
of the right of privacy, specifically, an amendment
overruling Wade would create the danger of chopping
off the development of this new right while it is still in
the process of early evolution, and of thus frustratingand even terminating- a basic contitutional principle
that rings true to the vast majority of the people.
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Editor's Note: Stephen R. Goldstein,
Professor of Law, is a native
Philadelphian who received his A. B.
from the University of Pennsylvania
in 1955 and his LL.B., summa cum
laude,from Penn Law School in
1962, where he was Research Editor
of the Law Review.
He practiced law in Philadelphia
from 1962-64, and then served as law
clerk to Justice Arthur J. Goldberg
ofthe U.S. Supreme Court. Mr.
Goldstein joined the Law School
Faculty in 1955, spent the year 197071 as Visiting Professor of Law at
the University of California in
Berkeley, and was Visiting Professor
at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, Israel, during the 1974-75
academic year while on sabbatical
from this Law School.
Professor Goldstein currently
teaches courses in civil procedure,
religion and the law, Jewish law, and
education law, an area in which he
has done extensive practical as well
as scholarly writing.
Journal: Your course in Education
Law encompasses a wide spectrum of
issues. How do you approach the
course and what areas does it include?
Goldstein: It essentially concerns
itself with the variety of legal
problems involving governmentfunded education below the college
level. 90 percent of the course is
about public schools, while the other
10 percent is about the legal problems
involved in government funding of
non-public
schools,
including
questions about new concepts like
voucher systems, to replace the
existing set-up of a sharp dichotomy
between public and private schools.
The course covers a variety of
problems, the first two-thirds pertaining to the individual and his / her
relationship to the school: who has
the right and who is compelled to
attend school; who determines
curriculum; the respective legal roles
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of teachers, administrators, school
boards, legislators, students, parents,
community groups, etc.; the rights of
expression of students and teachers;
problems concerning special education,
homogeneous
vs.
heterogeneous groupings, classifications of students; procedural standards that have to be followed in
student discipline; teachers' roles in
curriculum. The list goes on and on.
The last third of the course deals
with more general systemic problems
like desegregation, community control and decentralization, the financing of education, aid to non-public
schools, and collective bargaining.
The three organizing principles
around which the course is based deal
first with the question involved in the
allocation of the decision-making
power in the schools, and who has the
right to present its views in the
process of that decision-making.
Second, we study how accommodation is achieved in a society that
wishes to use education to inculcate
values to its youth and yet maintain
of
its
democratic
principles
autonomy, individuality, and the
freedom of its people, including
youth. We also examine the accommodation of two other competing
areas-that of the secularist, universalist values on which our country's
philosophy, at least in part, is based,
which conflicts with the desire to
allow for the development and

existence of ethnic, religious, and
racial sub-groups. Finally, I think of
the course as methodological, heavily
concerned with questions as to what
the roles of law and the courts are in
entering into these issues and in
trying to solve them.
Journal: Related to this area,
thirty-three states in the U.S. have
instituted programs holding teachers, professional administrators, and
school boards accountable for
providing students with guaranteed
educations. What are your thoughts
on
such
accountability
and,
specifically, the entrance by the
courts into educational malpractice
suits?
Goldstein: There is no way one can
argue that people who are paid to do
a job ought not be accountable for
how well they do it, particularly when
they are paid out of the public
pocket. Now, how a teacher's performance is measured and how much
one can expect teachers to do is very
difficult to ascertain. And just who
shall do the evaluating? In a law suit
in California, under a rubric of
accountability, there is an attempt to
have a court and jury be the deciders
by having a suit for damages for
educational malpractice against
teachers or school systems who have
not done their jobs. It seems to me
that our knowledge, at this time, of
what is malpractice and how much
can be attributable to a school

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

system's failure is so minimal that the
concept of having the court award
damages under a malpractice suit is,
to me, a very bad and wrong one.
I think we may expect too much
from school systems as an entity in
terms of increasing the learning of a
great deal of students. The pre-school
years, I believe based on what I have
read, may be more influential than
the later ones in determining how
well students do. One cannot ignore
the impact of environmental influences affecting them, and we must
keep in mind that school time is only
a segment in the scheme of learning.
Granted school systems should be
held responsible for trying to do
some things but there is much more
to consider in my way of thinking.
Journal: Academic freedom at all
levels of education seems to be an
area to which you are quite committed. In a lecture recently published in the Israel Law Review, you
examined the rights of university
professors to express controversial
statements unrelated to their
professions. Can you encapsulate
your article which will be published
this spring by the Penn Law Review
on another aspect of academic
freedom?
Goldstein: This article is longer and
more legally-oriented than the lecture on university professors. It
explores what Constitutional rights,
if any, public school teachers have to
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determine what they teach in their
individual classrooms over the objections of their superiors in the statesanctioned hierarchy.
I ultimately concluded that there is
no such Constitutional right of
teachers to teach what they desire in a
public school system.
When it comes to certain decisions
like the establishment of a political
philosophy or a given moral system, I
concluded that, in the light of our
history and societal sense in this
country as to the role of education
below the college level, the Federal
Constitution does not forbid local
school systems and local officials
from attempting to inculcate or
indoctrinate
value
judgments
through the instructional process in
the schools. Now, I don't want to say
that this is necessarily desirable, but
this article focuses on what is
constitutionally permissable.
Journal: Can you describe your
course on Jewish Law?
Goldstein: I officially joint teach it
with Dr. Barry Eichler, the ViceChairman of the Oriental Studies
Department, who is a brilliant guy.
Actually, we prepare together and
although I comment in class, it really
is more his course than mine.
It is essentially a comparative law
course in which we attempt to teach
the dynamics and development of
Jewish law from the perspective of
how a legal system can and does
adapt to change as required , despite
its "unalterable constitution". Our
concern is with the study of the
historical development of the system,
and we teach it in three sections: the
first is the investigation of biblical
law and its relationship to other
middle eastern legal systems; the
second area of study is post-biblical
Jewish law focusing on the Talmud in
terms of the development of the
process, bringing it up to modern
times; in the final unit, we deal with
the topic of abortion, treating it

through the entire development of
Jewish law.
Journal: Are students taking this
course and others like it that might be
of an enrichment nature?
Goldstein: The course did not
attract quite as many students as it
had two years ago when we offered it.
Maybe one of the reasons is that it
has lost popularity but, also, the Law
School has done away with distributional requirements, where
students had to take so many hours
from a specified area which might
have been labeled perspective or
enrichment. Jewish Law fell under
this category.
My sense is that the general trend
of the student body, in part because
of the glutted job market and
problems allied to this, is more
focused on the traditional "breadand-butter" courses. I think this
trend unfortunate. Students have the
next forty years to practice law and if
they don't get these courses now, they
never will experience them. This is
really the last opportunity to get
some enrichment before they become
very much narrowed in the practice
of law.
Journal: You and your family
spent the 1974-75 academic year on
sabbatical in Israel. Can you tell us
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why Israel? What did you do
professionally while there?
Goldstein: Two reasons influenced
our choice. Essentially my wife , two
children, and I wanted to live in Israel
for a year. Also, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem invited me to come
as a visiting professor. They also had
facilities- libraries and materials in
American law- in order that I might
continue my research on Problems of
American Education Law. Although
this had little to do with Israel, I did
investigate the Israeli educational
system and did some work related to
the Jewish Law course mentioned
previously.
Although afforded all privileges
given a visiting professor, I did not
teach per se at Hebrew University.
On occasion, I guest lectured for a
course that was offered on freedom
of expression; they were particularly
interested in American ideas concerning academic freedom . I also
gave a lecture to the law faculty, at
the request of the Dean of the Law
School, on the basic premise of
academic freedom.
This
was
prompted by an issue that caused
notoriety at the University involving
the rights of a chemistry professor
who had participated in some activities in support of the so-called
Palestine Liberation Organization.
I did teach a course in American
Constitutional Law at Bar-Ilan Law
School, a part of Bar-Ilan University
in Ramat Gan, at the urging of the
dean who is a long-time friend . I
taught fifteen once-a-week sessions
and, in retrospect, although reluctant
to give the time initially, found it a
most rewarding experience. The
students were extraordinarily receptive, and it was great teaching
American legal principles to people
who have not grown up in our
system. It gave one an entirely
different perspective on the material.
Journal: In what language did you
lecture- English or Hebrew?
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Goldstein: Now that was an interesting story. The original understanding was that I would speak
in English and the students would
speak to me in Hebrew. Although
their comprehension of English was
quite good, they were reluctant to
speak it, so the original plan worked
out well. As I became more fluent in
Hebrew and was more comfortable
using it, I switched and, by the end of
the course, was teaching in it
predominantly. The materials used,
mostly U.S. Supreme Court cases,
were in English, of course, so some
English had to be used. The translation problems were challenging and
an important part of the course. If
one decides how properly to
translate, for instance, the English
term "establishment of religion in the
first amendment", essentially one is
determining what the term means in a
very significant way.
Journal: How did you and your
family fare language-wise? Was it
important to be able to speak
Hebrew?
Goldstein: I had some Hebrewspeaking background but became
more proficient as the year progressed. Hebrew University offered a class
for faculty which was very good, and

my wife went to a club for immigrants in Jerusalem where she
took
a
government-sponsored
course.
It is important to speak or, at least,
to understand the language. One can
get along quite well speaking English
as a tourist but, to be part of the
social life of the country and to know
what is going on, one should understand the radio, TV, and be able to
read the newspaper. By the time I left,
I was reading a Hebrew newspaper
not as fluently, however, as I might
have The New York Times.
Our children came with some
knowledge but never any really
spoken background in the language,
and they went to school on
September I, into an all-Hebrew
speaking environment. For awhile
they were bored for they could not
actively participate verbally but,
after an adjustment period that
included special lessons in school,
they caught on fantastically.
Journal: To what extent did you
and your family become members of
the community?
Goldstein: We were visitors, obviously; however, within that context, we were quite involved with the
community. Our daughter belonged
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to a youth group comparable to the
scouts and, when she went on a fiveday encampment, I served for two
days as a guard in the camp.
Unfortunately,
when
sending
children to such places in Israel, it is
necessary that a certain number of
adults be present to protect them. It is
a terrible but true fact, which brings
to fore my involvement, every two to
three weeks, with the civil guard , a
corps of civilian volunteers who
protect the neighborhoods at night
by patrolling in pairs. Its purpose is
not to protect neighborhoods from
violent or street crimes; adults and
children freely walk, travel by public
transportation, or hitchhike until
quite late at night with no fear. The
patrol function acts as a deterrant,
primarily in terms of bombings, and
also acts as an important psychological function for the citizenry
to participate in their own security
problems.
Journal: Was your commitment to
Israel strong prior to your going?
Goldstein: Yes, but we became a lot
more so having lived there. Living
and dealing with the people directly
and having friends who are involved
make one bound to be more committed to the cause.
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In addition to practicing law full time,
Penn Law alumni may also be bankers or novelists
or active civll libertarians. The experiences
of three such people reveal how they have thrived
in their dual careers.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol11/iss3/1
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There are such a vast number of legal questions that
arise with respect to any loan, the running of the
institution, the kinds of relationships one has with
the depositors, what one can and cannot do, how to
protect the bank's interests, how to make
something feasible for the borrower-the whole
realm of uniform commercial code questions. I am
constantly amazed that bankers don't have little
lawyers in their vest pockets at all times.
Betsy Zubrow Cohen, L'66, President / Chairperson
of the Board of Directors / Chief Executive Officer at
Jefferson Bank, Downingtown, Pennsylvania, and
founding partner in the business law firm of Spector,
Cohen, Hunt and Rosen, Philadelphia, has every right
to this undoubtedly empirical reflection.
The extension of her career from the field of business
law to that of commercial banking seemed a natural
sequitur; she not only handles the securities work and
corporate financial problems for her firm but, in the
past, represented bank holding companies before the
Federal Reserve Board and banks and borrowers in
relation to one another. The first-hand opportunity to
observe regulatory, operational, and loan policies has
afforded Betsy the advantage of being able to wear two
hats comfortably-one of lawyer, one of banker-each
sustaining and complementing the other.
So how did Jefferson Bank evolve? Betsy Cohen and
her husband, Edward E. Cohen, L'65, purchased a farm
in Downington, Chester County, Pennsylvania, some
years ago for a weekend and summer retreat.
Familiarizing themselves with the area, they sensed a
need in the town for a new banking facility-the only
other having been chartered 110 years prior. Taking
hold of and verifying that instinct by conducting a
feasibility study on the vicinity confirmed their
notions-Downingtown was ready for another banking
institution.
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A major obstruction lay in the banking department in
Harrisburg, the state capital, which had neither granted
a charter in eight or nine years nor seemed inclined to do
so. However, Betsy was determined that "since I had
taken the project this far, perhaps it would really be
worthwhile pursuing it and seeing if all of the
professionalism that we brought to bear in representing
other people would bring to bear in this situation and
develop a persuasive case for a new institution." An
application was filed with the banking Commission in
October, 1973, and, in February of 1974, a charter was
granted.
While awaiting completion of the shopping center
that was to house its permanent quarters, the bank
occupied an 800-square-foot temporary building,
affectionately nicknamed "the hamburger stand"-now
the bank's drive-in facility. This small spot had, says
Betsy, "more assets per square foot than probably any
other institution in the world." You see, the bank
opened in October of 1974 with $2,000,000 in capital
and, at the end of 1975, had over $10,000,000 in assets.
Obviously, Jefferson Bank is doing exceptionally well
despite early fears that a new establishment in this small,
traditionalist town would be met with some resistance.
Betsy feels that their secret is the high-quality personnel
gathered to run the bank. "Over the c0urse of the first
six months, we were able to convince people that, if
nothing else, we really cared about their problems, and
this has proven a very welcome attitude." Because of
size, larger banking institutions are forced to circumscribe the activities of the banking personnel
providing services, thus limiting the solving of special
problems presented by customers. At Jefferson, the
inability to solve a problem is not dismissed with an "itis-not-bank-policy" response. Rather, a difficulty
triggers the beginning of staff discussion and analysis:
Why was this problem not solved? And how can it be
resolved next time? The customers' positive reactions to
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this sense of concern, says Betsy Cohen, has made the
difference "that has enabled us to grow in our
relationships with people. I like to think that the lawyer
in me has provided this problem-solving approach."
And what of this special personnel at Jefferson Bank?
Many of its major officers are women who previously
held banking positions but, perhaps, were not given the
opportunities to exercise their creativity elsewhere. A
case in point is the controller, who had been employed in
banking for many years and is finally being afforded an
outlet for the expertise she has developed. Approximately 80 percent of the bank's employment
population, many of whom are on the lower end of the
responsibility and pay scales, are women. As Betsy
notes,
Most discrimination suits by women against banks
claim that they [women] have not been permitted
into the mainstream of bank promotions; they
never get the chance to go up- only across. This is
not true at Jefferson Bank since we start at the top.
Jefferson is not a concern that, like many others
surfacing in our country, caters only to women. It does
for everyone what these banks do exclusively for the
female population. Incidentally, the executive vicepresident and director in charge of daily operations is a
man who has accumula.ted some years of banking
experience and is also being given the opportunity to
grow in his position.
One can analogize officers in a "country bank" to
general practitioners in a modest-sized firm. Not only
do they "sweep the floors," but they must be able to
absorb a wide range of information, since the luxury of
many people in specific job areas is not available. And, if
the customer is to be satisfied, which seems to be a prime
goal at Jefferson Bank, then each new situation and / or
problem is an exercise in the art of the possible.
Betsy Cohen has two irreconcilable points of view on
the question of a bank's accountability to its investors
and the public in the form of full disclosure of
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol11/iss3/1

information. She believes that the knowledge that
disclosure will be made is healthy for the corporate
officers, on whose actions it will have a restraining
effect, and for the public, who is entitled to information.
On the other hand, a bank, besides fulfilling its
traditional financial transactions, often serves as
financial counselor to its customers. For this to be
accomplished effectively, total confidence in the
institution and its professional people is mandatory.
"Disclosure, therefore, in good times, might be fine; in
bad times, it could taint this sense of security." Perhaps
this feeling could be obviated once people realized that
banks have, as Betsy explains,
human failings that don't necessarily relate to the
soundness of the institution. It need not have an
absolutely error-free record in terms of the
judgment on the types of loans that it makes, in
order to fulfill a valid purpose in financial
counseling. If information about a financial
concern would be presented effectively without
impairing its ability to function, should it deserve
to function, then I think that good disclosure rules
would have been reached.
Until recently, Betsy Cohen literally divided her time
between lawyer-ing and banking, spending mornings in
Philadelphia practicing law and afternoons in Downingtown at the Bank. She intends, in the next several
months, to devote herself completely to Jefferson. It is
in a period of enormous growth-another branch has
been approved and a site chosen-and "unless this small
ammount of time is captured, the many opportunities
built over the past year will not be fully developed."
There is another career of which this woman is very
proud- that of being a mother. She and her husband
are the parents of three children, aged 6, 5 and 2.
Betsy Zubrow Cohen is, indeed, one of those truly
exceptional people. Gracious, acutely intelligent, only
34 years old and already successful in two careers. What
next? The best may be yet to come.
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Children living in the State of New York should
include Ruth Rosenberg in their nightly prayers. They
have much to be grateful for since she has not only
awakened the courts to the question of the rights of
children to independent legal representation but has
also laid some important groundwork for the determination of their rights to equal protection.
In February 1975, Ruth B. Rosenberg, L'63, on
behalf of the New York Civil Liberties Union, entered a
case in which she, as the legal representative of a child ,
established that the interests of the child were distinct
and apart from those of the other parties in the case and
were deserving of equal consideration under law.
A 17 -year-old woman had gone to court to regain
custody of her 2\12-year-old daughter whom she had
placed in foster care when the child was 4 months old.
The foster parents refused to produce or make known
the whereabouts of the child until a full hearing was held
to determine the child's future , thus provoking the court
to send the foster father to jail on contempt charges and
resulting in the granting of a summary judgment
directing that the child be returned to the biological
mother. An appeal was taken. Rosenberg recounts her
feelings at the time:
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RUTH B. ROSENBERG, L'63
foster home? What was the biological mother like
now? Was she capable of handling the child? Not
one of these questions had been explored .
So, Ruth Rosenberg entered the case, having
convinced the Court that she would have a better
opportunity to do justice to the appeal on the granting
of summary judgment than the legal aid law guardian
who represented the child at the original abortive
hearing. And so it was that Rosenberg successfully
argued before the appellate division that the child had
a right to "her own day in court."
The rest is history. The case returned to the family
court where extensive inquiries and full psychiatric
studies of all parties were made. Rosenberg herself
spent hundreds of hours developing evidence that the
biological parent was, in fact, unfit to mother the child
and that the child's best interests were served by
adoption by the foster parents where she had enjoyed a
loving, stable environment and had developed soundly

I was appalled at these actions from my point of
view as a lawyer, a parent, and a person concerned
with the protection of civil liberties. A child is not a
pawn or an object that gets handed over to
someone with better proprietary rights like a piano
or chandelier. Here was this little girl who was
going to be returned without ever having had an
opportunity for the court to review what was best
for her. There had been no inquiry as to how the
child had changed over the years since she had been
placed in foster care. What had become her
attachments? What kind of emotional damage
would be caused by removing the child from her
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and happily. After a four-week trial the decision came
down denying the mother's request for the child's
return.
Significantly, the final ruling included five observations made by the court pertaining to the lack of
available means to invoke the standards of protection
for children, the needs and rights of children to
independent legal representation, and the changes that
must be made within the system to ensure them proper:
and fair delivery of legal services. An additional reward
for Rosenberg must have been the judicial recognition
of these fundamental principles.
This case is unusual fare for a partner in the 100-year
old firm of Nixon, Hargrave, Devans and Doyle in
Rochester, New York. Yet Ruth Rosenberg, who
practices law in the zoning, land use, preservation code,
and litigation areas of real estate law, has maintained
her intense, active commitment to the causes of human
rights and civil liberties.
The ability to pursue her personal commitment to
civil liberties' causes is itself a reflection of the
commitment of the nearly I 00 attorney firm of which
she is a part. The firm, long known for its responsiveness to the traditional calls upon attorneys to
support community agencies, encourages Rosenberg
and many other attorneys in the devotion of considerable time to less traditional social causes. The case
in which Rosenberg acted as Law Guardian saw nine
other attorneys in the office participate at various
times, totalling several hundred hours in addition to
the many hundreds of hours she spent in preparation
and court time.
Her volunteer work with the New York Civil
Liberties Union has been manifold. Organizationally,
over the years she has held top positions on the state
and local boards; professionally, her gifts as a talented
advocate have resulted in many victories. In the
turbulent 1960's, a busy decade for civil libertarians,
Rosenberg, under the aegis of the NYCLU, handled
cases involving the rights of students- one in which
students protested a dress code imposed by the school
administration and another concerning the suspension
of six students accused of incorporating allegedly "four
letter words" into a school election poster. It was
during this period that many people were charged with
desecrating the American flag and protesting the war in
Vietnam, and Ruth Rosenberg did her share of
representing young people in this area.
She represented the City of Rochester in a matter
that had wide civil liberties implications involving the
City's Police Advisory Board. This nonpolice organization, which reviewed charges of excessive physical
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force, was created in an effort to assuage Rochester's
outraged black and economically deprived citizens
when, during a time of racial unrest, a policeman's
bullet paralyzed a man assumed to be a burglar. The
local policeman's organization challenged the board's
right to exist and Rosenberg, taking the case at the first
appeal level, successfully carried it to the U.S. Supreme
Court, where her motion to dismiss for want of a
substantial federal question was granted. The board
was ruled legal, and Rosenberg won again.
She participates in other community organizations
such as the Board of Trustees of the Monroe County
Bar Association, the Pre-Trial Services Corporation,
the Jewish Federation, and the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, at all times asserting
the civil liberties' point of view to audiences of mixed
persuasion on those issues.
Where did she develop her skills and expertise as a
trial Ia wyer? In 1964, as the first woman to be hired by
the then Philadelphia firm of Blank, Rudenko, Klaus
and Rome, she worked as a member of a trial team
consisting of Edwin Rome, L'40, and Morris Weisberg,
L'47.
I could not have asked for two more talented
people in the world to have trained me. Morry
Weisberg taught me to think like a lawyer and to
attend to the skills of putting down on paper with
clarity and persuasiveness the position of my
client. As for Ed Rome, I have never seen a trial
lawyer with such talent, grace and genius. He has
served as the model against which I measure my
own efforts.
Ruth Rosenberg utilizes her career and, specifically,
her abilities as an advocate in a very special way. One
must admire her courage, for the causes she defends are,
most often, not those to which a conservative community might be sympathetic. Yet, she is most influential and
is looked upon with great respect in the Rochester area.
One suspects that, over the years, her sincerity, her
superior mental abilities, and her successful record of
protecting those values that she considers right have
afforded her credibility.
In addition to managing her diverse law practice, she
and her husband, Allen P. Rosenberg, an attorney with
the Administration at the University of Rochester and,
incidentally, the U.S. Olympic Crew Coach, are raising
four children.
The Rosenberg children together with the other
young people all over New York State are very fortunate
that a Ruth Rosenberg is out there championing their
rights. They could not hope for a better ally.
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ARTHUR R. G. SOLMSSEN,'53

One might envlSlon the Saul Bellows and Joseph
Hellers of our day agonizingly composing their "great
American novels" in solitary New England or Bahamian
retreats. One also might suppose the inner offices of an
elegant, archetypal Philadelphia law firm , the location
least conducive to inspiring a writer's creative genius.
Yet, Arthur R.G. Solmssen, L'53, corporate partner
with the firm, Saul, Ewing, Remick and Saul,
Philadelphia, is a successful novelist- writing SEC
documents by day and fiction by night.
He appears most content comingling the two worlds.
The lawyer Solmssen not only financially subsidizes the
writer (although his books do sell quite well) but
provides subject matter for the novels; conversely,
author Solmssen offers the technical knowledge and
expertise necessary to the writing of bond issues. What
more perfect a combination?
His three novels, of which two have merited Book-ofthe-Month Club or Literary Guild recognition, might be
viewed a trilogy. They are loosely related one to the
other as a result of Solmssen's continuing dissection of
the legal community and of society in general; his
allusions to Penn Law School and Philadelphia and its
environs; the reappearance and exploration of
characters encountered in previous works; and, most
significantly, the recurrent setting of the established
establishment Philadelphia law firm of Conyers &
Dean. Each work, however, is its own entity, possessing
a complex protagonist, intricate plots and subplots, and
well-delineated supporting characters.
Rittenhouse Square, Solmssen's first novel ,
chronicles the societal unrest and social changes
characteristic of the 1960s. This dramatic backdrop
complements the story of Ben Butler, a fledgling lawyer,
who was loaned by Conyers & Dean to the voluntary
defender's office and, after a month there, discovered
the rewards intrinsic to the defense of the helpless and
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the excitement to be found in the criminal courtroom.
His return to the womblike world of mergers, debentures, and finance forced a crucial reevaluation of his
priorities.
The plot of Alexander's Feast, the second novel,
published in 1971 , is extremely complex. Its action takes
place in two cities- Philadelphia and Salzburg, Austria
at the site of what Solmssen calls "The American
Academy in Europe" but which bears close resemblance
to the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies- and
during two time periods, just after World War II and in
the 1960s. The life and times of Graham Anders, partner
in Conyers & Dean and the novel's multidimensional
protagonist, are described amidst these settings and in
these time periods.
Solmssen's latest novel, The Comfort Letter, a Bookof-the-Month Club aiternate selection, explores the
personality of Ordway Smith, another partner in
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Conyers & Dean. He is an "everyman," not brilliant or
particularly dynamic but, as a result of his terrific social
connections, is among the firm's important "businessgetters." The novel traces the evolution and SEC
registration of $100,000,000 in debentures and Ordway
Smith's handling of his erratic, difficult client, the head
of the conglomerate that is floating the issue. In the
December 1975 edition of Philadelphia Magazine,
Professor Louis B. Schwartz presented his views on the
book:
Can one distill literature from the taut, dry world of
corporate finance or drama from the ethical crises
of middle-aged lawyers who run errands for takeover buccaneers? The Comfort Letter answers with
a tingling yes .. . Readers who feel guilt when
experiencing merely sensuous pleasure in a good
story will find here education and insight to gratify
the most Puritan lust for self-improvement. .. For
Solmssen's book is a sociology of power. . .a
textbook in the psychology of entrepreneurship.
Arthur Solmssen began his career as a raconteur very
early; as a child he entertained classmates who should
have been studying. He does not remember a time when
he did not have a story inside wanting to emerge. At
Harvard College, he did newspaper work but did not
write seriously until he became well established as a
lawyer. His legal education and first-hand experience as
a practicing attorney provided Solmssen with the
material to utilize his writing abilities.
Before I became a lawyer, no one would publish my
work. Perhaps I had nothing to say. Now I do. This
fascination readers have with the world of the
lawyer has made those who can explain it with
clarity- Louis Auchincloss and others- writers
people want to read.
Solmssen admits to having characters living in his
head , waiting to come out and be developed fully. He
did just this in the case of Ordway Smith, the main
character in The Comfort Letter, whom he was unable
to forget since Smith's minor role in Rittenhouse
Square. Solmssen dismisses his characters as pure
invention, amalgamations of many types of people.
However, in Alexander's Feast, one character was
partially fashioned upon a Penn Law professor, now
deceased, who made a vivid impression on his students.
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When asked ·how much of his work is
autobiographical, Solmssen replied, "I don't know. All
of it? None of it? Can it be measured? Some claim that
everything written by an author is autobiographical, but
that's not true. A lot is made up. Sometimes ALL of it.
I've talked with other writers about the curious fact that,
after you have finished a book, you can't always
remember what is real, what was researched, and what
was invented." He does, however, seem to draw heavily
from personal experiences for the framework of his
novels. Ben Butler worked for a month in the
Philadelphia defender's office, as did Solmssen.
Graham Anders participated in an international law
conference at an academy modeled after the Salzburg
Seminar in Austria. Solmssen was there in 1961 as an
American Fellow and visited many times thereafter. The
Comfort Letter so realistically describes, among other
aspects, the complexities of the business practice- the
area of the law in which Solmssen is actively engaged.
There are, of course, the "constants" found in each
novel- the settings of Philadelphia and its Main Line
suburbs, the law office, Penn Law School- all obvious
parts of Solmssen's life experiences.
Besides being a fine craftsman, he reveals a consummate knowledge of his area of specialization together
with the ability to" articulate its intricacies. Apropos of
this, Professor Schwartz said in a review of one of
Solmssen's books, "His novels make fine literature out
of investment maneuvers, proxy fights, and the tricky
use of the antitrust laws- matters more often explored
in The Wall Street Journal than in humanistic writing"
(The Philddelphia Bulletin, November 14, 1971).
Arthur Solmssen is a refreshingly open, easy,
unassuming person. It is amazing how these qualities of
informality are carried into his writing. At the outset, a
reader immediately feels included and comfortable, as
though with a long-time friend. One should not be
fooled , however, by this low-keyed, first-person
narrative style, for the complex personalities that
develop and the highly intricate plots that unfold make
for exciting and tension-filled reading.
And what of the future? Will the trilogy become a
quartet? Are there situations and characters within
Arthur R.G. Solmssen yearning to emerge and say "I
am"? The answers are probably in the affirmative, for
this rare man, this lawyer / author, who is balancing and
combining two fulfilling careers with equal mastery has
stated, unequivocally, that he has no intention of
relinquishing either one.
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Professor James 0. Freedman is the
author of an article "Delegation of
Power and Institutional Competence" that appears in the Winter
1976 issue of the University of
Chicago Law Review.
On February 14, 1976, he delivered
a paper entitled "Expertise and the
Administrative Process," before the
Council of the Section on Administrative Law of the American
Bar Association. An article based on
that paper will be published in the
Administrative Law Review.

Professor Alexander Capron was
named a Johns Hopkins Centennial
Scholar and addressed a meeting at
that university in October 1975.
His book, Catastrophic Diseases:
Who Decides What?, written with
Jay Katz and published by the
Russell Sage Foundation, New York,
is a legal and psychosocial analysis of
decision making about research and
treatment in advanced fields of
biomedicine, using kidney dialysis
and organ transplantation as the
examples under scrutiny.
Capron testified at the request of
the New York Assembly Committee
on Health on a bill to adopt a
legislative "definition of death" in
New York, December 1975. He has
also appeared on numerous television panels discussing the case of
Karen Ann Quinlan and, generally,
the question of euthanasia j"allowing
to die ."
He was a panelist at the Bench-Bar
Conference of the Philadelphia Bar
Association in September 1975.
Mr. Capron is presently acting
Vice-Dean of the Law School.

Professor Stephen R. Goldstein
published
an
article entitled,
"Academic Freedom: Its Meaning
and Underlying Premises as Seen
through the American Experience,"
II Israel Law Review 1, January,
1976.
Mr. Goldstein was also selected as
the
area
chairman
of
the
Metropolitan Region of American
Professors for Peace in the Middle
East.
Professor George L. Haskins was
elected an Honorary Fellow of the
American Society of Legal History at
the society's annual meeting. The
official announcement stated that
"this election represents the highest
honor the Society can bestow upon a
member." Fewer than five Americans
have been awarded the title.
In January, Mr. Haskins attended
the meeting of the American Council
of Learned Societies in Baltimore, as
well as the winter meeting of the
Maine Bar Association in Bangor.
Mr. Haskins is scheduled to
present a paper on the "Rights and
Obligations of Government with
Respect to Rural Communities in
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Colonial America" in May before the
Societe Jean Bodin pour I'Histoire
Comparative des Institutions, which
will be meeting in conjunction with
the Polska Akademia Nauk at Warsaw.
Professor Robert H. Mundheim has
been elected Vice-Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Investor
Responsibility Research Center, a
nonprofit corporation that analyzes
shareholder proposals and writes indepth studies of important social
responsibility issues faced by United
States corporations.
In December 1975, he chaired a
discussion of "The Corporate
Watergate," an examination of illegal political contributions and
questionable foreign payments by
United States corporations, held at
the Law School, with Professor
Louis B. Schwartz as one of the
panelists. Roughly I 00 representatives of financial institutions, universities, foundations , and church
groups attended the program, jointly
sponsored by Investor Responsibility
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Research Center and the Law
School's Center for the Study of
Financial Institutions. Professor
Mundheim participated in panels
discussing SEC questions relating to
the subject at The University of
California Securities Regulation
Institute in San Diego in January
1976 and at a seminar sponsored by
Institutional Investor, Inc., in New
York in December 1975.
Mr. Mundheim, with Arthur
Fleischer, Jr., cochaired The Practicing Law Institute's Seventh Annual Institute in Securities Regulation in New York City in November.
The program reviewed major
developments in securities regulation
and attracted roughly 650 lawyers
from the United States and Canada.
Professor Covey T. Oliver is consultant to the Department of State on
matters relating to the Law of the Sea
negotiations for the United States
and is a member of the United States
delegation to the Third Session of the
UN Conference on the Law of the
Sea, which opened in New York in
March.
Mr. Oliver will teach international
law at St. Mary's University this
summer and hen address the thirtieth
International Conference on Human
Sciences in Mexico City on the
following topics: "Export Cartels,
Trade, Aid, and International
Justice."

He will be on scholarly leave
during the spring semester, 1977, and
will be based in Paris, doing research
through the Office of Economic
Cooperation and Development on a
comparison between the development assistance policy of the European Economic Community and that
of its member states against a
background of United States
assistance
policy.
European
positions as to the role and place of
direct foreign investment in the
development process will also be
examined .
Professor Oliver was selected to
prepare and has completed a study of
the Constitution and the future of
United States foreign policy for a
bicentennial review of the Constitution by highly qualified persons,
under the sponsorship of the
American Academy of Political and
Social Science, in Philadelphia this
April.
Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer has
been appointed Reporter to the
Speedy Trial Planning Group of the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware.
He is also serving as a consultant in
connection with the National Survey
of Crime Severity, a three-year
project of the University's Center for
Studies in Criminology and Criminal
Law.
In April, Mr. Schulhofer will

serve, along with several other
faculty members, as a rapporteur for
the Bicentennial Conference on the
Constitution, sponsored by the
American Academy of Political and
Social Science.
Professor Louis B. Schwartz
delivered a talk to the University of
Pennsylvania College for Women
Program on Continuing Education
Series entitled, "Convicting the
Innocent: Should There be Criminal
Responsibility for Conduct Attributable to Ignorance, Mental
Illness, or Bad Judgment?," in
November 1975.
In December 1975, Mr. Schwartz
was a panelist, along with Securities
and
Exchange
Commissioner
Sommers and others, on "The Corporate Watergate" (pertaining to
illegal political contributions and
bribery of foreign officials) at the
Conference on Investor Responsibility sponsored by the Investor's
Responsibility Research Center.
He
reviewed
Arthur
R.G.
Solmssen's The Comfort Letter
Little, Brown, 1975, in Philadelphia
Magazine, December 1975, pp. 5455. Mr. Schwartz' article, "The
Cultural Deficit in Broadcasting,"
appeared in 26 Journal of Communication, 58, Winter 1976.
Throughout the year 1975, he
served as consultant with various
senators and congressmen on the
reform of federal criminal laws and
participated in various radio interview shows discussing this subject
among others.
Former Dean and Professor Bernard
Wolfman addressed members of the
Stanford
University
Alumni
Association on the subject of "The
Federal Income Tax SystemProcess, Structure, and Reform," in
March.
In July 1976, Mr. Wolfman will
become Fessenden Professor of Law
at Harvard Law School (see Symposium in this issue).
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'34
John S. Bernheimer announces the relocation of his law
office to 6523 North 9th Street,
Philadelphia, 19126.

Gerald J. Haas of
Philadelphia coplanned a Pennsylvania workmen's compensation
course sponsored by the Pennsylvania Bar Institute at which he
lectured. Mr. Haas was coauthor of
the manual as well.

W. Clark Hanna has
retired as the Prothonotary's
Solicitor, Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia, and has announced the
resumption of his private practice at
1420 Walnut Street, Philadelphia,
19102, and at 21 Church Road,
Norristown, Pennsylvania, 19403.

'53
Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.,
began his term as forty-ninth
Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar
Association in January 1976.

'38

Irving R. Segal was
elected to a four-year term as a
Regent of the American College of
Trial Lawyers, an organization in
which he was active for approximately 15 years. Mr. Segal is a partner in
the firm of Schnader, Harrison,
Segal and Lewis, Philadelphia.

'41
John J. Dautrich has
been elected to serve as President of
the Association of Defense Counsel
during the year 1976. He is a partner
in the firm of White and Williams,
Philadelphia.
'47
Robert M. Landis, a
former
Chancellor
of
the
Philadelphia Bar Association, was
elected President of the National
Conference of Bar Presidents at the
annual meeting of the American Bar
Association held in the summer of
1975.

James P. Schellenger,
Philadelphia, has been named Chief
Executive Officer of the Delaware
Management Company, Inc. He also
serves on the Board of Governors of
the Investment Company Institute.

'50
Hon. Joseph T. LaBrum,
Jr., was recently sworn as Common
Pleas Court Judge in Delaware
County, Pennsylvania.
'51
Harold Cramer, Chairman of the initial Board of Directors
of Graduate Hospital, has been
named President of a new Graduate
Hospital foundation created to acquire capital gifts, endowments,
annual giving, etc. Mr. Cramer is a
partner in the Philadelphia law firm
of Mesirov, Gelman, Jaffe and
Cramer.
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Hon. David N. Savitt,
Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas, has been appointed Court
Administrator by President Judge
Edward J. Bradley, L'53, as of
December 1, 1975.

'54
Hon. Berel Caesar was
named by Pennsylvania Governor
Milton J. Shapp to a seat on the
Philadelphia Common Pleas Court
bench, replacing former Judge D.
Donald Jamieson, L'50.
Morton S. Gorelick was
elected to a one-year term as President of the Cheltenham Township
Board of School Directors, Elkins
Park, Pennsylvania. Mr. Gorelick is
a partner in the firm of Steinberg,
Greenstein, Richman and Price,
Philadelphia.
Sidney T. Yates of Newtown, Pennsylvania, was elected to
the Board of Directors of Saint Mary
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Hospital, Langhorne, Pennsylvania,
where he also serves as solicitor and
secretary of the hospital authority.
Mr. Yates is a partner in the firm of
Stuckert, Yates and Drewson.

missioner, distinguishing her as the
first woman in the State of Pennsylvania to become a county commissioner. Ms. Whittlesey resigned a
seat on the Pennsylvania state
legislature to assume the county post.

'55

Prior to his death in
January 1976, Edwin D. Wolf was
the recipient of two awards: the
Haverford Award, given each year by
Haverford College to notable, deserving alumni; and the 1975 Fidelity
Bank Award, presented at the Annual Meeting of the Philadelphia Bar
Association in recognition of Ned
Wolfs significant contributions to
public interest law in the City of
Philadelphia, specifically for his
work as Director of the Public
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia
(PILCOP).

Hon. Irving M. Hirsh was
recently reappointed as Judge of the
Municipal Court of North Plainfield,
New Jersey, for another three year
term.

'56
George L. Bernstein of
Philadelphia will be President of the
Pennsylvania Institute of Certified
Public Accountants as of June, 1976.
He is the National Management
Advisory Services Partner in the
accounting firm of Laventhol and
Horwath.
Charles F. Ludwig has
joined the firm of Silver, Lovitz and
Atkinson, l>.A., 3 Penn Center Plaza,
Philadelphia, 19102, in the practice
of insurance company law, regulation, investments, and litigation.

'57
Jerrold V. Moss of
Philadelphia is Chairman of the
Government Study Commission,
which has drafted and recommended
a home-rule charter for Cheltenham
Township, Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania. The charter will be
submitted to the voters at the
November elections. His offices are
at
1201
Chestnut
Street,
Philadelphia.
'60
Rodman Kober has been
named Vice-President in charge of

transportation by Continental Grain
Company's North American Grain
Division, New York. He also serves
as Deputy Mayor and Police Commissioner of Manalapan Township,
New Jersey.
Hon. John A. Walter,
Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon
County, was elected to a I0-year tenrt
in November 1975.

'63
Gerald M. Levin of New
York, President and Chief Executive
of Home Box Office, Inc., addressed
the International Radio and Television
Society's
Fifth
Annual
Faculty I Industry
Seminar
m
Tarrytown, New York, in November.
Mr. Levin, since joining Home Box
Office, Inc., in 1973 has developed it
into one of the leading pay cable
networks in the industry and the first
cable system to go nationwide by
satellite.
Faith Ryan Whittlesey of
Haverford,
Pennsylvania,
was
elected Delaware County Com-
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'64
Robert W. Tollen has
become a partner in the firm of
Chickering and Gregory, Ill Sutter
Street, San Francisco, California,
94104, specializing in the representation of management in the private
and public sectors in labor relations
and related matters.

'65
Richard Gordimer has
been named general partner in charge
of the tax department in the office of
Seidman and Seidman, Hartford
Building, Orlando, Florida, 32800.
Harry R. Marshall, Jr.,
has accepted a position with the
Office of the General Counsel to the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and will reside in Chevy
Chase, Maryland.
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'66
Patricia Ann Metzer has
become Associate Tax Legislative
Counsel with the U.S. Treasury
Department, Washington, D.C.
'67

Carmen L. Gentile announces the formation of a
partnership under the firm name
Bruder and Gentile, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Suite 301 A,
Washington, D.C., 20006.
Stephen Schoeman announces the formation of his law
firm, Brotmann, Kornreich and
Schoeman, with offices at 271 North
Avenue, New Rochelle, New York,
and 60 East 42nd Street, New York
City.
Eric C. Woglom of New
York has become a partner in the
firm Fish and Neave, 277 Park
Avenue, New York, 10017.

'69
Eric M. Lowin anI10unces the formation of his new
partnership under the firm name
Bloom and Lowin, 666 Fifth Avenue,
New York, 10019.

a member of the firm Silver, Lovitz
and Atkinson, P.A., 3 Penn Center
Plaza, Philadelphia, 19102.

'72
Keith S. Armour of the
firm Shultz, Fahy and Street, has
established a firm office at 100 East
Main Street, Stillman Valley, Illinois, 61084.
Frank W. Bubb, III, is
presently employed at the Scott
Paper Company, Philadelphia.
Joseph H. Cooper has
joined the legal staff of The New
Yorker magazine. His article "The
Law School Way" appeared in The
Journal of Legal Education (vol. 27,
no. 3, 1975), and his "Business
Executives as Authors- The Wallace
Stevens Tradition" appeared in the
December 1975 issue of Finance. Mr.
Cooper served as speechwriter and
publications editor for the National
Association of Securities Dealers in
Washington, D.C., during 1975.

'73

Richard P. Sills IS
associated with the Washington,
D.C., firm of Ginsberg, Feldman and
Bress. In 1974, he received an LL. M.
in taxation with highest honors from
the George Washington University
National Law Center. He is the
author of "The 'Dealer-Investor'
Problem: Observations, Analysis,
and Suggestions for Future Development," which was published in the
Fall 1974 issue of The Journal of

Real Estate Taxation.

'71

Paul J. Duca has become

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

Joseph P. Coviello has
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announced the formation of his law
firm, Dunn, Byrne, Coviello and
Eisenstein, with offices at 234 Scranton Life Building, Scranton, Pennsylvania, 18503, and 234 East College
Avenue, State College, Pennsylvania, 1680 I. He is Solicitor to the
Dunmore school district and is
cofounder and Secretary Treasurer
of San barco Planning Services, Inc.,
an educational consulting firm. Mr.
Coviello spoke at the 1975 Law
Alumni Day seminar on the topic of
the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law.
Steven A. Kauffman has
joined the law firm of Gever and
Grife, 1313 Robinson Building,
Philadelphia, 191 02.
Frank J. Sensenbrenner,
Jr., is the Assistant Attorney General
in the legal services division of the
Justice Department for the State of
Wisconsin.
George W. Westervelt,
Jr., has announced the formation of
his firm, Royle and Westervelt, 738
Main Street, Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, 18360.

'7 4
Leonard Cooper has
become an associate in the firm
Fidelman, Wolffe and Waldron,
Suite 300, 2120 L Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C., 20037, specializing in patent law.
James M. Franklin is a
Deputy
District
Attorney
in
Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Jeffrey Horowitz and his
wife announce the birth of their son,
Joshua Andrew, on October 11,
1975.
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C:nd note!
From the Editor

publication of his challenging article
something special has been recorded
for posterity.

Many are the rewards of this job.
Having worked with the late Ned
Wolf on his article, "I Have Promises
to Keep ... ," in the Winter 1975
Journal, was one such rare experience. His passing came just days
after the Journal was circulated.
Not only was the personal exposure to this courageous man a gift
in itself, but one feels that with the

Professor Robert H. Mundheim
displayed incredible modesty when
he described the quality of his tennis
game in our "Conversation with ... "
Winter 1975 Journal, as something
"to be kept a closely guarded secret."
Well, the secret is OUT. Mundheim
and his partner were the first-place,
silver
trophy
team
m
the
Philadelphia
Bar
Association's

Fourth Annual Tennis Tournament
held in December.
In this issue, the Journal introduces a new forumlike section,
"Something to Say ... a personal
view," to which we hope you will
contribute.
It is our desire that the new feature
will serve as a vehicle by which indepth, personal opinions on subjects
of your choice may be freely expressed in article form.
Please let us hear from you.

In Memoriam

'13

Isaac D. Levy, Philadelphia, November 29, 1975

'15

Justin S. Hamburger, Philadelphia, October 18, 1975

' 17

John P. Creveling, Allentown, Pennsylvania, December 15, 1975

'21

Robert Dechert, Gladwyne, Pennsylvania, November 8, 1975

'22

Thomas McConnell, III, Haverford, Pennsylvania, November 6, 1975

'24

Charles D. Smeltzer, Philadelphia, December 26, 1975

'30

Peritz Berman , Chester, Pennsylvania, November 21 , 1975
Bernard M. Zimmerman, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, December 2, 1975

'32

Eugene A. Nogi, Scranton, Pennsylvania, December 7, 1975

'37

Bruce S. Cronlund, Horsham, Pennsylvania, April 22, 1975
Irwin Slipakoff, Miami, Florida, September 2, 1975

'38

Frederick Y. Dietrick, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, December 10, 1975
Wendell R. Good, Erie, Pennsylvania, August 22, 1975

'42

Norman H. Abrahamson, Philadelphia, January 27, 1976

'44

Willia m E. Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware, November 27, 1975

'51

.John F. Healy, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 6, 1975

'54

Bennet N. Hollander, Reston, Virginia, December 27, 1975

'63

Edwin D. Wolf, Philadelphia, January 21, 1976
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